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From the early years of Sproul's presidency until the 
Treasury-Federal  Reserve Accord of 1951,  Federal 
Reserve  policy was subordinated to the Treasury's  war- 
time and  postwar financing needs. In this 1955  speech, 
Sproul speaks of the resurgence of flexible monetary 
policy. He invites the academic economists in his audi- 
ence to turn their  attention to the study  of  central  bank- 
ing issues and to contribute in this way to informed 
monetary policy decisions. Sproul's address  provides 
an overview of the structure,  techniques, and objec- 
tives of the Federal Reserve  System and  gives particu- 
lar attention to the policy-making role of the Federal 
Open Market Committee. 
Reflections of a Central Banker 
by Allan Sproul 
while failing to fool his audience. I am  not a professional 
economist. I hate to make a fool of myself. And I know 
I could not fool you. 
I may have to skate pretty close to what is, for me, 
the thin ice of theoretical economics, however, because 
although  I am  not a professional  economist  I am a 
practitioner of an art which must draw inspiration from 
the work of professional economists. Central banking is 
largely practical economics, a sort of laggard son  of 
theoretical economics, and I have been practLing cen- 
tral banking for the past 35 years. My long apprentice- 
ship in the field  is the excuse for the title which has 
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been given to my talk, "Reflections of a Central 
Banker." Maybe that sounds as if I were going to give 
you some rocking chair stories of my experience, but 
that is not my intention. I think it would be pretty dull. 
What I would like to do is to discuss a few of the things 
I have observed and thought about while I have been 
an officer of the Federal Reserve System and which I 
think might merit a larger measure  of interest and 
attention from you. 
Monetary policy was in the doldrums for a number of 
years prior to and  during World War II. It had  been 
running fast before a brisk breeze for quite a while 
prior to that time, and then the wind died down and its 
sails went slack. Big claims had been made for it as a 
solvent of our economic ills, and when it couldn't sup- 
port  these claims there was a tendency to discard it in 
favor of more direct and what might seem to be more 
powerful economic controls. I suspect that somewhat 
the same pattern could be traced in the interest  of 
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in the problems of central banking. For a time, preced- 
ing and following the passage of the Federal Reserve 
Act in 1913, such problems attracted a lot of men. Then 
it began to appear that more important work could be 
done, or more hay could be made, in other  branches of 
economics, while interest in central banking suffered a 
relative decline. Now there has  been something of a 
renaissance in the  use of monetary policy as one of 
the means of achieving greater economic stability with- 
out sacrificing too much economic freedom. If we are 
careful  not to claim too much for it, it may hold  its 
place. And I am hoping that central banking problems 
will similarly recapture the interest of a new generation 
of economists. 
Continuity and change in the Federal 
Reserve System 
Let me speak first and most particularly about the Fed- 
eral Reserve System, its organization, its policies, and 
its techniques. You all know the general organization of 
the System, but you may not all be aware of the evolu- 
tionary  changes which have been taking place within 
the general organization. The  main outlines of the Sys- 
tem  are much as they were  when the System was 
established 41 years ago: a regional system, federal in 
character, with a national coordinating and supervisory 
body at Washington and 12 regional Federal Reserve 
Banks which are the operating arms of the System in 
their respective districts. 
Within this framework, however, there has been  a 
definite tendency for power and influence to gravitate 
toward the center, a corollary of developments in other 
areas of social, political, and economic organization, as 
well a  a result of growing familiarity at the center with 
the means of accomplishing things at the periphery. 
Fortunately, I think, for the development of the System 
and the good of the country, this tendency has not 
gone so far as to destroy either the federal character of 
the System in terms of policy formation, or its regional 
character in terms of policy execution. 
That this is so, is largely due to the development of 
the Federal Open Market Committee, and its evolution 
as a body in which the various parts of the System are 
represented not by blocs, not by opposing groups of 
members of the Board of Governors on one side and 
Presidents of Federal Reserve Banks on the other,  but 
by individuals having equal statutory authority and 
equal statutory responsibilities with respect to one of 
the  most important functions of the System, namely, 
open market operations. 
It is true that the means of credit control, other  than 
open market operations, are scattered about the Sys- 
tem in what seems to be an illogical manner.  Discount 
rates are fixed by the Boards of Directors of the mdi- 
vidua  Federal Reserve Banks but are reviewed and 
determined by the Board of Governors, and the setting 
of reserve and margin requirements is wholly  a charge 
of  the Board of Governors. But all of  these measures  of 
credit control must be integrated and used as a com- 
mon kit of tools. The Federal Open Market Committee 
provides the forum where discussion of their coordi- 
nated use can take place without unnecessarily infring- 
ing upon the rights  and duties of other parts of the 
System. The illogical  in  terms of organization charts 
and precisely drawn lines of authority becomes logical 
in terms of the evolution of a body which appropriately 
and effectively represents all parts of the System. 
It may be useful to recall how this unique arm of the 
System developed, not from some sudden inspirational 
attack on the problem of bringing national unity to a 
regional central banking system, but by trial and error 
during a shakedown cruise of about 20 years duration. 
In the beginning, adjustments of the reserve positions 
of member banks were made entirely through the dis- 
count window. Early open market operations emerged 
in the form of an attempt by individual Federal Reserve 
Banks to supplement their earnings. It soon became 
apparent that the effect of these purchases and sales 
of government securities (and bankers bills) was to put 
reserves into the banking system or to take them out 
without regard for what might be credit policy at the 
time. The first informal attempt to correct the situation 
was the adoption  by the Conference of Governors 
(Presidents now) of Federal Reserve Banks, in 1922, of 
a policy of buying and selling government  obligations in 
an orderly and systematic manner, and the appoint- 
ment of a committee of five Governors to see that this 
was  done. This loose arrangement was .tightened up 
somewhat by the Federal Reserve Board in 1923,  and 
the rule was adopted, which has since become a statu- 
tory principle of open market operations, that the time, 
character, and volume of such operations must be gov- 
erned with primary regard to the accommodation of 
commerce and business and to their effect on the gen- 
eral credit situation.  In 1930 an  open market policy 
conference was created which included a representa- 
tive of each of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks.  Statutory 
recognition of and restraint upon this particular method 
of conducting open market operations was legislated in 
1933, when the banking act of that year created a Fed- 
eral Open Market Committee and prohibited open mar- 
ket operations  of Federal Reserve Banks  except in 
accordance  with the regulations of  the Federal Reserve 
Board. The Federal Open Market  Committee  in its pres- 
ent form came into being with the passage  of the 
Banking Act of 1935, which also made it mandatory for 
Federal  Reserve  Banks to engage in open  market 
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lations of the Committee. 
So far so good. Evolution has proceeded by a pro- 
cess of natural selection  toward  a higher form of 
organism, which retains some of the desirable charac- 
teristics of regional organization within a federal sys- 
tem, while acquiring the powers necessary to a 
coordination of national policy under present day con- 
ditions. This organism has survived for 20 years and 
given evidence of being able to adapt itself to environ- 
mental change. 
There are those, however, who see in the persistence 
of present regional representation on the Federal Open 
Market Committee a serious flaw in our credit control 
machinery. They appear to believe that this has 
enabled the poachers to remain on the Committee 
along with the game wardens, in the person of the five 
Presidents of Federal Reserve Banks who are mem- 
bers of the Committee along with the seven members 
of the Board of Governors. The Presidents of the Fed- 
eral  Reserve Banks,  they say, are  selected  by the 
directors of the Banks—to be sure, with the approval of 
the Board of Governors. The nine men who serve as 
directors of Federal Reserve Banks include six men 
elected by the member banks  of their district, and 
three of these men are bankers. Ergo, the Presidents 
of Federal Reserve Banks are the representatives of 
the  member banks  and, in political terms, must be 
responsive to the wishes of their constituents or they 
won't be Presidents very long. And so, it is  claimed, the 
group which  is  supposed to be regulated  and  con- 
trolled has at least one hand on the controls, or at least 
five fingers in the pie. 
This line of chain  reasoning has its appeal if you 
believe that the Presidents of Federal Reserve Banks 
are so beholden to commercial bankers for their jobs, 
and  so  lacking  in awareness of their statutory 
responsibilities, that they cannot  honestly serve the 
public interest as members of the Federal Open Market 
Committee.  The fact is, however, that the relation 
between a President of a Federal Reserve Bank and 
the bankers of his district is not that of an elected rep- 
resentative and his constituents or an employee and 
his employer.  The present somewhat complicated 
arrangements  for the election and  appointment  of 
directors of Federal Reserve Banks, and for the 
appointment of Presidents of Federal Reserve Banks 
by these directors, have instead a double virtue. First, 
they inject into the System's conduct of its everyday 
affairs the standards of efficiency and practical judg- 
ment that well-chosen business executives can provide 
from their own experience—and that includes every- 
thing from judging the fitness of a man to administer 
the complex operations of a Federal Reserve Bank to 
the maintenance of its plant and equipment. This has 
contributed  to an operating  performance  which  has 
protected  Federal Reserve Banks from much of the 
criticism which is leveled against other institutions not 
prodded toward efficiency by the profit motive. Second, 
these electoral  arrangements keep the  Presidents of 
Federal Reserve Banks directly in touch with men who 
are aware of banking and credit conditions and eco- 
nomic developments  in their districts and who can help 
to interpret credit policy to the banking, business, and 
agricultural community, without making the Presidents 
subservient to whatever may be the selfish interests of 
any group in the community. 
On the even more important level of policy formation, 
the problem is not comparable to that faced by a gov- 
ernment regulatory body fixing rates and conditions of 
service under monopoly or semimonopoly conditions, 
nor to the problems of an administrative tribunal watch- 
ing over observance of the law. The main problem of 
the central  banking system is the appraisal of major 
developments  affecting the whole economy and the for- 
mulation of a policy which will influence the money and 
credit sector of that economy so as to contribute to the 
stability of the economy as a whole. This is a public 
service which requires of its  practitioners continuous 
contact with economic processes, and with people in 
the market places of the country as well as with the 
representatives of government at its political center. It 
requires practitioners with an awareness of the prob- 
lems of an economy which is neither wholly private nor 
wholly public in character. It requires practitioners who 
are insulated against narrow partisan political influence 
on the one hand, and  against narrow selfish private 
influence on the other, but who are responsive both to 
broad government policies and to the importance of 
private  initiative and private enterprise in giving  sup- 
port to those policies. In my view there has been devel- 
oped in the Federal Reserve System in general, and in 
the Federal Open Market Committee in particular,  a 
unique contribution to the democratic administration of 
such a task. There  is no conflict of interest  in  this 
administration. 
I have spoken of this matter of organization at some 
length because I think it is vital to the preservation of a 
Federal Reserve System which retains regional vigor in 
a national setting, and because attempts to destroy the 
Federal Open Market Committee, as presently constitu- 
ted, have been made from time to time. In fact, a bill 
has been resting in a congressional committee for the 
past year which would abolish the Federal Open Mar- 
ket Committee and transfer its functions to an enlarged 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
That way lies a revolution in the organization of our 
credit control machinery. I believe that this is a ques- 
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organization and which needs and deserves your clos- 
est scrutiny as citizens, as well as economists and men 
of finance. 
Federal Reserve policy objectIves 
So much for organization. Now for a reference to poli- 
cies. The preamble to the Federal Reserve Act says 
that the  Federal Reserve System is to be concerned 
with the provision of an elastic currency, affording a 
means of rediscounting commercial paper, and estab- 
lishing a more effective supervision of banking in the 
United States, and for other  purposes. Well, the "other 
purposes" have long since stolen the show, as must be 
the case when  the  manifold objects of an economic 
experiment are compressed into a few words, no mat- 
ter how well chosen. We are all now engaged in an 
attempt to prevent the occurrence of wide and deep 
economic fluctuations and to mitigate the hardships of 
the smaller cyclical fluctuations and the necessary 
internal adjustments of a dynamic, growing, relatively 
free-choice economy. 
The role of the  central banking system in this attempt 
to achieve better balance in our economy has never 
been spelled out specifically, and probably cannot be. 
We were not specifically mentioned in the Employment 
Act of 1946, which gave expression to the present gen- 
eral concept of the economic role of government, but 
our share of the general responsibility derives largely 
from that expression of national policy. I have always 
felt, however,  that if we are to be true to the explicit 
requirements of our own charter, we must emphasize 
the  implicit requirements of this broader charter by 
combining stability  of the purchasing power of the dol- 
lar with the promotion of the most effective possible 
utilization of our resources. We must be alert to oppose 
both inflationary and deflationary pressures, either one 
of which can upset the precarious balance of a high- 
employment, high-production, high-income economy. 
Controlling inflatIonary pressures 
We are pretty  much all of one mind, I take it, when it 
comes to opposing deflationary forces which threaten a 
waste of human and material resources. But there is no 
such unanimity when inflation—usually trotted out as 
mild inflation—is in prospect or in being. Here is a 
central  banking problem  with respect to which we 
should, perhaps, have had more help from you  than 
you have so far given us. Are we right in the belief that 
stability of the dollar  and a growing high-level economy 
are compatible? Or, at least, are we right in our belief 
that there are so many forces in the economy which 
now exert inflationary pressure as to make it likely that 
our role will generally be to resist those pressures in 
the interest of sustained economic growth? The siren 
song of gradual modest inflation, if it be that and not 
the music of the spheres, appeals  to many groups, 
political and economic. There is a tendency to relax 
and enjoy the sound of more money in the cash regis- 
ter and the appearance of more dollars in the balance 
sheet and  in  the pay envelope.  The problem  has 
become  a fundamental  one in the administration of 
monetary policy, and your advice  and  counsel and, 
indeed, your leadership are needed. 
There are those, of course, who think  the answer has 
already been given, and that our powers have been 
reduced to exerting a gentle tug on the reins from  time 
to time, which is really  administered by the horse. With 
that I cannot agree; I cannot bear  witness to the impo- 
tence of our central banking system. It still has consid- 
erable power, even though we recognize, as I think we 
must, that general monetary controls can no longer be 
used so drastically as to bring about a severe restric- 
tion of the money supply with restriction of income, pro- 
duction, and employment in its wake. In this we would 
only find support if we were faced with a runaway infla- 
tion due solely or primarily to monetary causes. That  is 
an emergency we have not had to face and certainly 
do not have any desire to face, even though the actual 
experience of such a catastrophe might subsequently 
make for broader public  understanding of the anti- 
inflationary steps we must take from time to time. In 
developed countries  which  have experienced  hyper- 
inflation the central bank has only to mention the word 
inflation to bring a large measure of public support to a 
restrictive credit policy. When we mention inflation as a 
reason for trying to restrain a boom which shows signs 
of temporarily exhausting physical capacity to increase 
the supply  of goods and  services, and  in circum- 
stances when further injections of bank credit are likely 
to show up largely if not entirely in increased prices, 
we are apt to be charged with crying wolf when there is 
no wolf, to be denounced as apostles of deflation. And 
if actual inflation does  not develop, perhaps because 
we have done our job of helping to curb its develop- 
ment, the accusation against  us  seems to gain 
increased validity. You can see why I would like to have 
aid and comfort in resolving doubts about our ability to 
combine a stable dollar with a growing, expanding, 
high-level, peacetime economy. 
The exercise of Individual judgment 
Another aspect of policy formation which concerns me 
is whether or not undue reliance is now being placed 
upon the judgment of men, and whether we should 
seek some automatic or mechanical guides to policy 
action.  I do not think that we have been led too far 
astray by reading our press clippings. When it  is  said of 
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men have more financial power than any other official 
body in the United States history," we may think it will 
impress our children  and  grandchildren, but we are 
also humble enough to recognize that the  power we 
wield is a circumscribed one which cannot be wielded 
arbitrarily or capriciously. In the first place, it is a power 
exercised by a group of individuals of differing back- 
grounds and talents and with differing approaches to 
the policy actions upon which they must finally agree. 
There are checks and balances such as are charac- 
teristic of our whole concept of  government, which give 
assurance that decisions will be reached by a  delibera- 
tive process and that power will not be wielded by an 
individual who might acquire the habits of a despot. In 
the second place, it is power exercised in the white 
light of full disclosure: weekly, monthly, and annually 
our actions are publicly reported for all to examine and 
to judge. Finally, it is power exercised within the limits 
of national objectives and  public tolerance, which 
would not permit the Committee to indulge a sense of 
power or to experiment rashly with it, even if it were so 
inclined. 
But to recognize the limitations of our powers is not 
to deny their importance. We must and do take them 
very seriously. We realize that we are trying to mea- 
sure and adjust the flow of credit in a money economy, 
and we  are  steeped  in the belief that whether the 
economy works well or poorly depends in part on our 
success or failure in  discharging our responsibilities. 
And therein, I think, lies a danger.  The  oppressive char- 
acter of such a heavy responsibility leads men to seek 
some automatic or mechanical device  as a guide to 
policy action, in order to remove the risk of exercising 
fallible human judgment. The gold standard, as it exis- 
ted during  the latter part of the nineteenth century and 
the early years of the present century,  largely per- 
formed this role in those countries which had central 
banks and which looked first and almost entirely to the 
state of  their balance of payments and the size of their 
gold reserves in formulating ôentral bank policy. Those 
"good old days" began to pass into history, however, 
when  central bankers began consciously to interfere 
with the effects of inflows and outflows of gold upon the 
domestic credit situation and, through it, upon the 
domestic economy.  They receded further into limbo as 
national policy became more and more oriented toward 
the maintenance  of high levels of production and 
employment  at home, and tried to fit together the inter- 
national and the domestic situation without  subordinat- 
ing one to the other. 
And yet there have been and no doubt are serious 
students of central banking who believe that it cannot 
function  properly without  a "norm" of behavior, or a 
mathematical equation, which will tell its human guides 
what to do and when to do it. In the present state of 
our  knowledge  of the functioning of the economic 
world, and despite the flood of available statistics which 
never seems to be out of spate, I do not believe that 
we can now devise a "norm" or an equation which will 
relieve us in any substantial and consistent way of the 
necessity of exercising human judgment in discharging 
our responsibilities. What we need is not just a cata- 
logue and synthesis of symptoms but an appraisal of a 
whole situation, including the complex reactions  of 
human beings—businessmen, labor leaders, con- 
sumers, politicians. Early in my career in the Federal 
Reserve System I read a statement by Allyn  Young1 
which impressed me then and impresses me now: 
In fact, we can be certain that reliance upon any 
simple  rule or set of rules  would be dangerous. 
Economic situations are never twice alike. They 
are compounded  of different elements—foreign 
and domestic, agricultural and industrial, monetary 
and  nonmonetary,  psychological  and  physical — 
and these various elements are combined in con- 
stantly shifting proportions. 
"Scientific" analysis,  unaided, can never carry 
the inquirer to the heart of an economic situation. 
Judgment and wisdom  — the power to take a com- 
plex set of considerations into account and come 
to a balanced view of them—are quite as much 
needed  as  facts  and theories. The Federal 
Reserve System needs to operate in the light of all 
the information it can get, and it needs to have this 
information organized and analyzed in such a way 
as to give the maximum amount of illumination. But 
it also needs the guidance of that practical wisdom 
which is born only of experience. 
If in Our time, however, with increasing knowledge  of 
how credit policy works, we can discover a "norm" of. 
action,  or a mathematical guide to policy, our task 
would be greatly simplified. To do that, we shall have to 
know more than we yet know about how monetary and 
credit policy actually affect the economy, as a whole 
and in its various parts, and with what  leads and lags. 
This will mean deep probing into the operations of our 
money and banking system as it is  now constituted, 
and into the effects of changes of monetary and credit 
policy  upon the  whole economy working through the 
banking system. Until this job is further along, a good 
motto for central banks may continue to be the lines of 
the poet: 
1Amerjcan  economist  and university professor  (1876-1929). 
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And wisdom lies in masterful 
administration of the unforeseen.2 
Open market operations 
I am now going to turn to one of the techniques of 
execution of central bank policy, partly because it has 
importance from a general economic standpoint which 
transcends its purely technical  trappings,  and partly 
because it has been the subject of some public com- 
ment and discussion during the past year or two. I refer 
to the range of open market operations: whether such 
operations should be rigidly confined to short-term gov- 
ernment securities, except under the most unusual cir- 
cumstances, or whether a willingness at times to 
operthe over the whole range of maturities of govern- 
ment obligations would provide a better  means of mak- 
ing credit policy effective. I am not going to reiterate all 
of my own views, which are already in the record and 
which are distinctly minority views within the  Federal 
Open Market Committem There  are as yet no abso- 
lutes in this business, however.  Those who advocate, 
and I who oppose, the present techniques of the Fed- 
eral Open Market Committee are merely climbing the 
hill on opposite sides, trying to reach the same summit 
of knowledge and effectiveness. 
But I do think that the question is one worthy of the 
attention of at least some of you who are here today, 
not merely as a matter of casual comment in  panel 
discussions, or writings on other  subjects, but as some- 
thing which has  real  economic significance  and 
deserves serious study. And I am encouraged in this 
opinion by the articles  which have appeared in the  jour- 
nals during the past year. If the present technique 
derives from a too rigid application of supposed classi- 
cal economics to problems of money and credit, we 
need enlightenment from  you. 
I had supposed that the classical  economists, the 
men of private property and free markets, didn't think 
that free markets could provide everything necessary 
to the public good, and that if they were our contem- 
poraries they might have thought  of the market for 
money and credit as something  separate and  apart 
from other markets, and  as an appropriate  area of 
intervention by government or agencies of government 
— intervention  at that cross-section  of the economy 
where the public need for some overall economic guid- 
ance toward stability  could be provided with a minimum 
of direct intrusion into the details of production and dis- 
tribution. And I had supposed that this would  mean 
central bank action to help the market in determining 
the significant characteristics of the maturity structure 
2Robert  Bridges, "The Testament of Beauty. 
of interest  rates implied  by the kind of credit policy 
being pursued—not  to try to set decimal points on 
daily quotations, nor to peg a curve, but to nudge the 
market in the direction  sought  by credit policy. And 
finally I had supposed that the effects of increases or 
decreases in capital  values, arising from changes in 
long term rates of interest, were becoming more and 
more important in an economy in which public as well 
as private debts have become so large a part of our 
so-called assets, and that some direct intervention in 
this area  might at times  be appropriate. Whether or not 
these or contrary suppositions are true, it seems to me 
that this matter of open market techniques involves 
problems of economic significance beyond its immedi- 
ate technical application and that it deserves  your 
study and your published findings. 
There is another area of credit administration which 
can be brought under the loose heading of techniques. 
That is the problem of selective credit controls, and 
particularly the control of consumer instalment credit. I 
suppose that all of us who have a bias against detailed 
planning "from  above" would prefer that credit policy 
accomplish its major aims by general quantitative con- 
trols which work  impersonally but pervasively and with- 
out interfering directly  with individual transactions. But 
if there has grown up a form of credit extension which, 
no matter how prodigious its contribution to mass pro- 
duction and mass consumption, is also introducing a 
dangerous element of instability in our economy,  and if 
it is difficult to reach this credit area by general credit 
measures without adversely affecting  all of the  less 
avid users of credit, is there not a case  for a selective 
credit control? Thackeray says in Vanity Fair: 
Everybody must have observed  how well those 
live who are comfortably and thoroughly in debt; 
how they deny themselves nothing; how jolly and 
easy  they are in their minds. 
Well, I am not jolly and easy in my mind. I am disturbed 
by the present situation in consumer instalment credit, 
just as I was concerned, under different conditions and 
for different reasons,  about stock market credit until the 
Board of Governors was given power to establish, and 
to vary, margin requirements. I am disturbed not by the 
total amount of consumer credit, but by the fact or the 
indication that successive relaxation of terms has been 
largely responsible for keeping the ball in the air. This 
is a process which cannot go on indefinitely, and when 
it ceases there will come a time when repayment of old 
debt will catch up with  new extensions of credit, The 
special stimulus of a rapidly increasing net supply of 
consumer credit, which has contributed so much to the 
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goods during the past year, will then be gone, at least 
temporarily. Will it then become clear  that we drove our 
productive  capacity  to unsustainable  limits—for the 
present—by borrowing  consumer  demand from the 
future? 
This is a subject on which many voices have 
expressed many views, but usually they have not been 
views which seem objective enough to help resolve the 
question in the best interest of society as a whole. I 
know that there are those who believe that selective 
credit controls are a dangerous step on the  road to 
general  overall planning,  and  I have  no desire to 
become a fellow traveler on that road. But I do believe 
that there is a temptation to abuse consumer credit in 
boom times, that it can thus become a serious source 
of instability  in our economy, and that we would not 
jeopardize our general freedom from direct controls by 
giving the Federal Reserve System permanent author- 
ity to regulate consumer credit. I freely admit, however, 
that this view would  be better held if it were based 
more firmly on objective study and research into the 
place of consumer credit in our economy and less on 
observation and opinion. That is the sort of basis for 
consideration and action which you could provide. 
The same or something similar might be said of 
mortgage financing, but I shall not try to go into that. 
Economics and social objectives become intermingled 
so fiercely when  housing  is discussed  as to make 
calmness and objectivity a handicap, if not a badge of 
moral delinquency. 
The basic question involved in both cases is whether 
an attempt should be made through regulation of these 
specific types of credit to exert a stabilizing influence 
on areas of the economy which, in the past, appear to 
have been major sources of instability of employment 
and production, or whether we should be content with 
efforts to regulate the overall availability and cost of 
credit, hoping that fluctuations in the major areas of  the 
economy will balance  out. Our experience, thus far, 
suggests to me that general credit controls can exert 
an effective influence on these particular types of 
credit only with a considerable lag and that we cannot 
rely upon countervailing forces in the economy  to 
maintain overall stability. 
Perhaps you can see where I have been heading in 
these somewhat random remarks, which have touched 
on a few aspects of central banking organization, poli- 
cies,  and techniques, while  not  mentioning others of 
equal or, perhaps, even greater importance. In general, 
my purpose has been to frame a plea for help. A plea 
that theoretical  economics come  more steadily  and 
effectively  to the aid of practical economics in such 
fields as central banking. 
A public role for theoretical economics 
I recognize that theoretical economics is the basis of 
practical economics. And I recognize that theoretical 
economists, in our time, seem mostly to have preferred 
to work  on general principles, or on building models of 
economic performance, rather than on economic poli- 
cies and their effects. I have not the competence to 
challenge the value of their  work, but I question 
whether it is enough. I question whether economists 
individually and as a group can fulfill their obligations 
as citizens, as well as students and scholars, if they do 
not try to bring these interests together. I would say we 
need a revival of political economy, and I would invite 
you to look on central banking as a good place to start. 
The economists of an  earlier day did not hesitate to 
jump into the thick of battle over current issues, and it 
did not seem to lower their academic standing then nor 
should it now. They were pamphleteers, they organized 
and  participated  in  public meetings  and discussion 
groups, they brought their influence to bear  in any way 
they could on public officials and private citizens. They 
were pungent  and provocative  in  debate. Macaulay 
said of James Mill and his followers on one occasion, 
"These smatterers whose attainments just suffice to 
elevate them from the insignificance of dunces to the 
dignity of bores." Perhaps that sort of thing is a little 
too violent for our present mood and condition. But it 
might be better than withdrawing  completely  into a 
realm of esoteric jargon, or indulging in an excess of 
politeness in dealing with your peers and your public, 
so that issues  are seldom drawn clearly enough to 
attract public  attention and  promote  public under- 
standing. By your studies  and your research and your 
application  to the problems of economic theory, you 
have earned the right to be heard and to give some 
sense of continuing direction to official action and to 
public opinion. I would like to see that right more vig- 
orously  exercised. 
I feel that it could be exercised more vigorously and 
to advantage in the field of central banking. We have 
excellent research staffs in the Federal Reserve Sys- 
tem,  able  economists and  statisticians  and devoted 
students  of money and  banking problems. But their 
work needs more cross-fertilization and critical  anal- 
ysis by thoughtful  and disciplined  minds outside the 
System who can apply their talents to this special field 
without the bias of an organizational viewpoint. Not 
enough work  has been done, I would say, on the mone- 
tary problems of a mixed government-private  economy, 
on the functioning  and  form  of a fractional  reserve 
banking system in such  an economy, on the growing 
importance of other financial institutions, which criss- 
cross both the fields of commercial banking and invest- 
ment banking, and on the performance  and charac- 
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subjects which are  becoming critical  in the develop- 
ment of central banking. 
You have tended, I venture to say, to occupy your- 
selves too much with the refinement of old ideas which 
are no longer wholly relevant, with the cataloguing of 
new economic processes, with the application of math- 
ematical equations  to situations too dependent  on 
human behavior to be amenable to such treatment, or 
with building utopian models of the dream world of the 
future, while neglecting the hard but rewarding task of 
studying the present in a way which would contribute 
effectively to public policy and private well-being. If  you 
will not use it against me, I would say that  you have left 
the latter task to the improvised judgments of practi- 
tioners  who  have lacked the time or the equipment 
needed to work out a coherent and consistent basis for 
the actions which they must take. 
It is said that there has been a renaissance of mone- 
tary and credit policy in  recent years. In fact,  some 
extravagant claims are again beginning to appear con- 
cerning the power and influence of monetary measures 
in curing or ameliorating our economic ills.  Govern- 
ments may be tempted to commit or condone economic 
errors, in the hope that monetary policy can  redress 
the balance and in the hope that the central  banking 
system will stand as a buffer between the government 
and an electorate which chafes at restraint. We shall 
have to guard against asking too  much of monetary 
policy. But it is a fact that monetary measures have re- 
established themselves, and rightly so, as one of the 
principal means used by governments to try to keep 
national economies in order without the stifling restric- 
tions of more direct physical controls. 
What I would now like to see is a renaissance in the 
study of money and banking in general and of central 
banking in particular. I would  like to see a fresh and 
thorough  examination  of our existing banking  and 
credit machinery and our money and capital markets. I 
would  hope that out of such study and examination 
would come new ideas and new proposals which would 
give shape and direction to future public policies and 
private actions. It would be a task worthy of the best 
talent you can bring to bear on it. 
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